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LEGAL MEMORANDUM ON REINTEGRATION OF FORMER PIRATES
Executive Summary
The purpose of this memorandum is to identify best practices for
reintegration programs of ex-combatants in the context of piracy off the coast of
East Africa.
Many East African pirates are Somali. Somalia, however, currently lacks
the infrastructure necessary to prosecute suspected pirates. As a result, other states
in the region prosecute Somali pirates within their domestic legal systems. While
this regional assistance is necessary to combat piracy, it results in the challenge of
having Somali ex-combatants incarcerated outside of Somalia and, upon release,
the challenge of reintegrating individuals into civil society in Somalia and its
neighboring states.
The difficulty of reintegrating ex-combatants into society is a familiar
problem. Sub-divisions of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations,
and state governments have implemented many reintegration programs around the
world as a part of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs. The
successes and failures of these prior programs provide lessons for reintegration of
ex-combatants in the Somali piracy context.
This memorandum highlights a number of best practices and
recommendations. The economic and physical security of ex-combatants is the
most decisive factors in the success of reintegration programs. To achieve the
necessary security to successfully reintegrate ex-combatants, states must:
(1) provide ex-combatants money; (2) prepare ex-combatants for or provide
relevant and adequate employment; (3) provide adequate reintegration kits;
(4) invest in the broader community; (5) provide psychological counseling and
peace resolution training; (6) involve non-governmental organizations;
(7) carefully consider when to terminate benefits; (8) account for underage excombatants; and (9) effectively communicate about the reintegration program to
the public. The program should be closely monitored throughout its
implementation.
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LEGAL MEMORANDUM ON REINTEGRATION OF FORMER PIRATES
Statement of Purpose
This memorandum provides recommendations for how to reintegrate former
pirates within states engaged in piracy prosecutions. The first part of this
memorandum briefly reviews the piracy situation off the coast of East Africa and
the states involved in the capture, detainment, and/or prosecution of alleged
pirates. The second part of this memorandum discusses the purposes of
reintegration programs for former pirates, provides an overview of traditional
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, and reviews where
former pirates will likely have to reintegrate. The third part of this memorandum
provides overviews of individual states’ reintegration programs. Finally, the fourth
part of this memorandum provides recommendations for the implementation of
reintegration programs for former pirates in states involved in piracy prosecutions,
such as Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Somalia.
Introduction
Reintegrating ex-combatants into civil society is a difficult undertaking.
Despite its difficulties, it is necessary for states to engage in rigorous reintegration
programs to ensure that ex-combatants become productive members of society.
Reintegrating former pirates back into the civil society of their own state or into
the civil society of another state has its own unique challenges. States undertaking
such programs should take these challenges into account and learn from past
reintegration programs in order to achieve success.
The Status of Piracy near Somalia
Who Are the Pirates?
Pirates working in the waters off Somalia and the Horn of Africa are mostly
Somali. 1 These pirates can be divided into three main categories: (1) exfisherman; (2) ex-militiamen; and (3) technical experts, who know how to operate
equipment such as satellite phones and GPS devices. 2 Many current and former
1

Lauren Ploch, Christopher M. Blanchard, Ronald O’Rourke, R. Chuck Mason, Rawle O. King, Piracy off the Horn
of Africa, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 1 (Apr. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf. [Source # 32]

2

Hunter, Robyn, Somali pirates living the high life, BBC, October 28, 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7650415.stm. [Source # 44]

1
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pirates claim that they undertook piracy out of economic desperation or that they
are endeavoring to decrease the number of international ships in Somali waters
because the ships deplete important fish resources. 3
Efforts to Prosecute Accused Pirates
Prosecutions and Imprisonment in Somalia
Currently, Somalia is not capable of incarcerating or prosecuting all of the
accused and convicted Somali pirates. A significant challenge to prosecuting
accused pirates in Somalia is lack of infrastructure. Somalia does not have
sufficient prison capacity to incarcerate the number of captured Somali pirates, and
many of the prisons that do exist are antiquated. 4 Likewise, the infrastructure of
Somalia’s judicial system is not strong enough to undertake enough piracy
prosecutions.
Despite these challenges, progress is being made towards increasing the
number of those who can be incarcerated and prosecuted in Somalia. The United
Nations helped complete a new prison in 2010, 5 and the international community
is working with Somalia to build more. 6 In addition, the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”) is already supporting national prosecutions in
3

Piracy off the Somali Coast, Final Report, INTERNATIONAL EXPERT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST, 15
(Nov. 10-21, 2008), available at http://www.asil.org/files/SomaliaPiracyIntlExpertsreportconsolidated1.pdf [Source
# 33]; Lauren Ploch, Christopher M. Blanchard, Ronald O’Rourke, R. Chuck Mason, Rawle O. King, Piracy off the
Horn of Africa, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 9 (Apr. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf. [Source # 32]
4

Horand Knaup, Somalia’s Piracy Problem: Robbery on the High Seas Too Lucrative to Refuse, ABC NEWS
(June 18, 2011), available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/somalias-piracy-problem-robbery-high-seaslucrative-refuse/story?id=13859183 (“Berbera’s jail is a dark vault built by the Turks in the 19th century.”). [Source
# 46]

5

Frank Langfitt, Somaliland Struggles In Effort To Fight Piracy, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 15, 2011),
available at http://www.npr.org/2011/04/13/135345974/somaliland-struggles-in-effort-to-fight-piracy [Source # 47];
UNODC and piracy, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, available at
http://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/piracy/index.html [Source # 55]; Jack Lang, Report of the Special Adviser to
the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, para. 109, delivered to the
Security Council, S/2011/30, para. 110 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/Lang_report_S-2011-301.pdf [Source # 39].
6

Finland to Support UNODC Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FINLAND
(Sept. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.finland.org.sa/Public/default.aspx?contentid=227876&nodeid=40844&culture=en-US [Source # 21];
Jack Lang, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, paras. 109, 111, delivered to the Security Council, S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Lang_report_S-2011-301.pdf [Source # 39]; Comment by
Special Adviser Jack Lang, In Race Between Pirates and International Community, Pirates Clearly Winning,
Secretary-General’s Top Legal Adviser on Piracy Warns Security Council, Security Council, SC/10164 (Jan. 25,
2011), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10164.doc.htm. [Source # 25]
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Somalia and working towards the establishment of special chambers within
Somalia’s court system, which would receive capacity-building assistance from the
United Nations. The UNODC Counter Piracy Programme has been in place since
May 2011.
Prosecutions and Imprisonment in Other States
To combat piracy, multiple states and the United Nations are involved in
naval operations in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. As a result, a number of
pirates have been captured, and a percentage of those captured were detained and
brought to trial. As of October 2011, the UNODC reported that the following
states have taken on piracy prosecutions: (1) Belgium (number of cases not
reported); (2) Comoros undertook six cases; (3) France undertook 15 cases;
(4) Germany undertook ten cases; (5) India undertook 119 cases; (6) Japan
undertook four cases; (7) Kenya undertook 143 cases; (8) Madagascar undertook
12 cases; (9) Malaysia undertook seven cases; (10) Maldives undertook seven
cases; (11) Netherlands undertook 29 cases; (12) Oman undertook 12 cases;
(13) Republic of Korea undertook five cases; (14) Seychelles undertook 64 cases;
(15) Somalia (Puntland undertook 290 cases; Somaliland undertook 94 cases;
South Central undertook 18 cases); (16) Spain undertook two cases; (17) Tanzania
undertook 12 cases; (18) United Arab Emirates undertook ten cases; (19) United
States of America undertook 28 cases; and (20) Yemen undertook 129 cases. 7
Kenya in particular has been heavily involved with prosecuting accused
Somali pirates. The special court to try suspected pirates opened at Mombasa’s
Shimo la Tewa prison in June 2010, after the UNODC received donations from
Germany, France, Australia, Canada, and the European Union. 8 As of July 2010,
the 123 individuals detained either as suspects or following conviction in Kenya
accounted for 0.2 percent of the state’s overall prison population. 9 Kenya stopped
7

Counter-Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 11 (Sept./Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_7_WV.pdf (noting that at the time of publishing,
“[n]ot all information on the status of those in custody . . . was available.”). [Source # 8]
8

Q&A: What do you do with a captured pirate?, BBC, Jan. 25, 2011, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11813168 [Source # 35]; Dapo Akande, Anti-Piracy Court Opens in
Kenya, EJIL: TALK! (June 28, 2010), available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/anti-piracy-court-opens-in-kenya/.
[Source # 3]
9

UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and
imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including, in
particular, options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international components, a regional
tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work
of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the existing practice in establishing international and
mixed tribunals, and the time and resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results, para. 30,
S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c74d3a02.html. [Source # 38]

3
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accepting pirate suspects in 2010 because of the strain it put on the state’s justice
system and already overcrowded prisons and slowed down the rate it engaged in
piracy prosecutions. 10 As of January 2011, Kenya held 130 suspected pirates. 11
Seychelles also has been actively prosecuting accused Somali pirates. The
31 suspects held on remand pending trial in Seychelles as of July 2010 accounted
for close to ten percent of the prison population. 12 Seychelles has a prison that
meets UNODC’s standards and has the capacity to house the convicted pirates and
piracy suspects in Seychelles. 13 The 60-bed prison block was opened on
September 9, 2011. As of September 2011, Seychelles had undertaken 64 piracy
prosecutions. 14
In addition, Mauritius has signed an agreement with the European Union
Naval Force Somalia to allow for the trial of piracy suspects in Mauritius’ national
courts. 15 UNODC is working to improve facilities at the state’s Intermediate Court
and at its Beau Bassin Prison. 16
Despite these efforts, many states are reluctant to continue or expand the
number of prosecutions because of the expense of incarcerating those found guilty
10

Mohamed Yusuf, UNODC Praises Kenyan Anti-Piracy Actions, SOMALIA REPORT (Mar. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/407/UNODC_Praises_Kenyan_Anti-Piracy_Actions. [Source # 56]

11

Q&A: What do you do with a captured pirate?, BBC, Jan. 25, 2011, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11813168. [Source # 35]
12

UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and
imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including, in
particular, options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international components, a regional
tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work
of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the existing practice in establishing international and
mixed tribunals, and the time and resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results, para. 30,
S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c74d3a02.html. [Source # 38]

13

Counter-Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 6 (Sept./Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_7_WV.pdf. [Source # 8]
14

Amber Ramsey, Barriers to Prosecution: The Problem of Piracy, CIVIL-MILITARY FUSION CENTRE, 6 (Sept.
2011), available at
https://portal.mmowgli.nps.edu/c/wiki/get_page_attachment?p_l_id=33393&nodeId=10773&title=Published+papers
&fileName=Published+papers%2FCFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Prosecution_Aug_2011_FINAL.pdf. [Source # 5]
15

Counter-Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 12 (Sept./Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_7_WV.pdf. [Source # 8]
16

Counter-Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 12 (Sept./Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_7_WV.pdf. [Source # 8]

4
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of piracy. This is a considerable expense, as prison sentences for piracy can be
lengthy. As a result, other states are demanding that Somalia develop a more
robust prison system so that after a state prosecutes an alleged pirate and that
person is convicted, he can serve his time back in Somalia at Somalia’s expense.
For this reason, Mr. Jack Lang, the Special Adviser on Legal Issues Related to
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, categorizes the lack of correctional capacities in
Somalia and other states in the region as the “main obstacle” to prosecuting
accused pirates. 17 Another issue is that prosecuting and detaining states cannot
legally repatriate Somali pirates if the Somali prisons are inadequate. Sending and
receiving states have international legal obligations, and one such obligation is that
a sending state must ensure that a receiving state adequately and humanely
incarcerates convicted pirates. In fact, “some of the transfer arrangements between
arresting states require the prosecuting state to seek the agreement of the arresting
state before transferring convicted pirates to Somalia.” 18 Therefore, until adequate
prisons exist in Somalia, other states cannot fully participate in the prosecution of
accused pirates.
Future Prosecution and Imprisonment Goals
The short-term goal of the international community is to prosecute accused
Somali pirates in states other than Somalia but to incarcerate the convicted pirates
within Somalia. The United Nations hopes that states other than Somalia will
continue to prosecute those suspected of piracy while Somalia works to reestablish an effective court system. 19 The United Nations is also considering a

17

Jack Lang, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast
of Somalia, para. 109, delivered to the Security Council, S/2011/30, para. 109 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Lang_report_S-2011-301.pdf. [Source # 39]
18

Counter-Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 11 (Issue Five, Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/piracy/20110209.UNODC_Counter_Piracy_February_Issue.pdf.
[Source # 7]
19

Counter-Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 10 (Issue Five, Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/piracy/20110209.UNODC_Counter_Piracy_February_Issue.pdf
[Source # 7]; see also Jack Lang, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, para. 109, delivered to the Security Council, S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Lang_report_S-2011-301.pdf (“The burden on the prison
system, with sentences that can be as high as 20 to 30 years or even life imprisonment, discourages the States of the
region from initiating the prosecution of pirates who have not been apprehended in their territorial waters. If Somali
pirates found guilty in neighbouring countries were transferred to Somalia, it would remove a major obstacle to their
effective prosecution.”). [Source #39 ]

5
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proposal for an extraterritorial specialized court, applying Somali law, to sit in a
third country in the region. 20
The long-term goal is to improve the infrastructure of Somalia to the extent
that it can conduct piracy trials itself. This will take significant time and resources.
Conclusion
Therefore, the current status of affairs is that Somalia and neighboring states
are undertaking prosecutions and are incarcerating Somali pirates. All the states
involved with incarcerating these ex-combatants should implement reintegration
programs in the prisons. Some of these former pirates will reintegrate into
Somalia’s society, and others will reintegrate into the societies of other states.
Thus, these ex-combatants face reintegration challenges both within and outside of
Somalia.
Reintegration Programs for Former Pirates
Purpose of Reintegration Programs in the Somali Piracy Context
The purpose of reintegration programs is to prevent ex-combatants from
returning to piracy after incarceration and to establish better security within
Somalia and the region. Because Somali pirates attack non-Somali vessels, the
reintegration of former Somali pirates is an issue that affects many states other than
Somalia itself. Accordingly, it is to the advantage of other states in the region to
assist with the reintegration of former Somali pirates.
Overview of Traditional Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Programs and Potential Application to the Reintegration of Somali Pirates
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (“DDR”) programs are
implemented to address the security problem that exists when ex-combatants are
left without livelihoods and support networks. DDR is the process of “disarming
combatants, preparing them for civilian life and providing them with opportunities
for sustainable social and economic reintegration.” 21 While the name suggests that
there are three components to the program, there are actually four. Before
20

Security Council Meeting, comment by Stephen Mathias, SC/10164 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10164.doc.htm. [Source # 42]
21

Operational Guide to the IDDRS, UNITED NATIONS INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP ON DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION, 24 (2010), available at
http://unddr.org/docs/Operational_Guide_REV_2010_WEB.pdf. [Source #31]

6
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reintegration can be achieved, there is a reinsertion phase. Reinsertion “is the
assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longerterm process of reintegration.” 22 This is a form of transitional assistance that helps
cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and often includes
“transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term
education, training, employment and tools.” 23
There is also a collection of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
activities referred to as “second generation DDR.” The United Nations
Department on Peacekeeping Operations explains that “[w]hereas traditional DDR
focuses mainly on combatants that are present within military structures, the focus
of second generation programmes shifts away from military structures towards the
larger communities that are affected by armed violence.” 24 Another difference
between traditional DDR programs and second generation DDR programs is that
“[i]nstead of implementing relevant provisions of a peace agreement, [s]econd
[g]eneration activities are programmed locally using an evidence-based
approach.” 25 Second generation DDR programs have been implemented where the
necessary preconditions for traditional DDR programs are absent, after the
completion of traditional DDR programs, or alongside traditional programs. The
term “second generation” is a misnomer because second generation DDR may be

22

Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, A
Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping, UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 23 (Jan. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/ddr/ddr_062010 [Source # 41]; see also DDR In Peace Operations
A Retrospective, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 4 (Sept. 2010), available at
http://unddr.org/docs/DDR_retrospective.pdf. [Source # 13]
23

Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, A
Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping, UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 23 (Jan. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/ddr/ddr_062010 [Source # 41]; see also DDR In Peace Operations
A Retrospective, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 4 (Sept. 2010), available at
http://unddr.org/docs/DDR_retrospective.pdf. [Source # 13]
24

Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, A
Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping, UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 3 (Jan. 18, 2010), available at
http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. [Source # 41]
25

Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, A
Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping, UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 3 (Jan. 18, 2010), available at
http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. [Source # 41]

7
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used to address unfinished aspects of traditional DDR, it may be implemented as a
parallel effort, or it may be used without a traditional DDR counterpart. 26
Lessons from these second generation DDR programs are likely to be
beneficial for states trying to integrate former pirates into their societies, as pirates
are not part of an organized military structure, and there is no official peace
agreement that encompasses pirates in place. Prisons can adopt successful aspects
of second generation DDR programs to promote reintegration of Somali pirates
post-incarceration.
Where Can Former Pirates Reintegrate?
Somali ex-combatants may prefer to return to Somalia upon release and
might resent integration programs in other states. These ex-combatants need
programs that focus on reintegration into Somalia. Other ex-combatants may seek
asylum in the state that prosecutes them. 27 For Somali prisoners who cannot return
or do not desire to return to Somalia, programs should prepare them for integration
into the civil society of the receiving (typically incarcerating) state.
Reintegration of Former Pirates in Somalia
There are two significant difficulties with implementing repatriation and
reintegration programs in Somalia. First, Somalia is not a unified state and has
been without a central government since 1991. Second, Somalia lacks the
necessary infrastructure to implement a successful repatriation and reintegration
program.
The fact that the state is not unified leads to unique challenges. Although
the international community recognizes a centralized government in Somalia, in
reality, the state is still divided into the three relatively autonomous regions of
Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central. Reintegration programs must work with
the governments of the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland, but
recognize that these regions might not willingly participate in certain aspects of a
state-wide reintegration program. For example, although the Somaliland
government has made significant progress towards having the capacity to
incarcerate convicted pirates, it refuses to house non-Somaliland pirates in its jails,
26

DDR in Peace Operations a Retrospective, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 15
(Sept. 2010), available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/ddr/ddr_retrospective102010.pdf.
[Source # 13]

27

See e.g., Somali fisherman alone in Paris after piracy acquittal, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 23, 2011,
available at http://news.ph.msn.com/business/article.aspx?cp-documentid=5686302. [Source # 43]
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as Somaliland considers itself an independent state separate from the rest of
Somalia. 28
Successful reintegration programs require significant money and resources.
Somalia, a state whose 2010 GDP per capita ranked as 220th of the world’s states
and territories, 29 does not have sufficient resources itself to fund a program.
Moreover, its infrastructure is underdeveloped. 30 Thus, Somalia will have to rely
on international resources from United Nations agencies, NGOs, and private
donors. 31
Even though there are significant challenges to reintegrating former pirates
in Somalia, organizations attempting to launch such a reintegration program may
be able to draw from past and current reintegration efforts Somalia has undertaken
for other types of ex-combatants. For example, from 2005 to 2007, the state
worked to reintegrate militia members in Mogadishu. 32 In addition, Somalia has
an ongoing reintegration program designed to support the local peace process. 33

28

Frank Langfitt, Somaliland Struggles In Effort To Fight Piracy, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 13, 2011),
available at http://www.npr.org/2011/04/13/135345974/somaliland-struggles-in-effort-to-fight-piracy?ps=rs (“At a
news conference, Somaliland’s minister of justice, Ismail Aar, said his government refuses to take pirates from other
parts of Somalia — much to the consternation of the U.N.”). [Source # 47]

29

Country Comparison: GDP – Per Capita, World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2004rank.html?countryName=Somalia&countryCode=so&regionCode=afr&rank=220#so.
[Source # 9]

30

To serve as an example, in 2010, only eight of every 100 Somalis had a telephone subscription, and only 1.1
persons per 100 people used the internet. GDP per capita was -1.4% over the period of 1970 to 2008. Human
Development Report 2010, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 209, 214 (2010), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Tables_reprint.pdf. [Source # 24]
31

Jack Lang, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast
of Somalia, 3-4, delivered to the Security Council, S/2011/30, para. 110 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Lang_report_S-2011-301.pdf (Funding for the counter-piracy
effort in Somalia comes from the United Nations Development Programme, the International Maritime
Organization, and the Trust Fund of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.). [Source # 39]
32

Disappointing Conclusion to Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Programme, SAACID (June
2007), available at http://www.saacid.org/uploads/DDR_2007_-_Concluding_Statement_June_2007.pdf. [Source
# 16]
33

Somalia – DDR and Armed Violence Reduction, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, available at
http://www.undp.org/cpr/content/slideshows/Map/avmasa/briefs/avmasa_somalia.html. [Source # 45] For a
description of the Armed Violence Reduction / DDR project, see Armed Violence Reduction / DDR Project, UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, available at www.somalipeacebuilding.org. [Source # 4]
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Reintegration of Former Pirates in States Other than Somalia, Such as
Kenya, Mauritius, or Seychelles
As discussed above, many states are involved with detaining and prosecuting
accused Somali pirates. It is logical for the states involved with the prosecutions to
be involved with the reintegration efforts. Some states, such as Kenya, Mauritius,
or Seychelles, are not only involved with prosecuting accused Somali pirates but
also are geographically near to Somalia compared to some other states involved
with the prosecutions. Thus, they are more directly affected by the piracy
situation, and they are likely to be relied upon to prosecute accused pirates more
than some other states.
Because the majority of former pirates are Somali nationals, programs in
Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, or another state, are integration programs, not
reintegration programs. There are significant challenges to integrating Somali
nationals into societies that are not their own. One substantial hurdle is that excombatants might not speak the language(s) of the integrating state. The official
languages of Somalia are Somali and Arabic, and there are minority languages
such as Bravanese and Kibajuni. The official languages of Kenya are Swahili and
English, and there are many more languages spoken in Kenya. The official
languages of Seychelles are Seychellois Creole, English, and French. The official
language of Mauritius is English, and Mauritian Creole and French are also
commonly spoken.
In this regard, integration programs in Kenya, Mauritius, and Seychelles
might prove more similar to the situations of refugees or asylum seekers who
attempt to integrate into new communities. Although beyond the scope of this
memorandum, a review of asylum and refugee programs may guide reintegration
efforts in states other than Somalia.
Overview of States’ Reintegration Programs
This memorandum analyzes the reinsertion and reintegration components of
DDR programs from Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Colombia,
Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon
Islands, and Uganda to identify best practices for reintegrating former Somali
pirates. 34 An overview of each such program is set forth below, while the last

34

The authors also reviewed other states’ DDR programs but chose not to include them in this memorandum either
because the programs were factually inapplicable or because studies reviewing the programs do not exist.
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section of the memorandum provides recommendations for reintegration based on
the various programs’ experiences.
Afghanistan
In January 2003, the Afghan Transitional Authority created the
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, and the Afghanistan New
Beginnings Programme was established in March 2003 to support the work of the
commission and implement the DDR process. Many U.N. agencies and various
other international organizations have been involved in the reintegration programs
in Afghanistan. 35 As of 2005, it was estimated that the cost of the DDR program
was $2750 per person, with approximately 63,000 persons receiving benefits, for a
total cost of $174.3 million. 36 As of March 2006, 55,804 ex-combatants had
chosen a reintegration option. 37
Two separate reintegration programs were established, with varying levels
of success. 38 One of the programs targeted pro-government forces. This program
was voluntary, and most of the targeted combatants were successfully processed. 39
A separate program was established to force resisting groups as well as other rebel
and criminal groups to return to civilian life. The involuntary program was not as

35

United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center: Afghanistan, UNITED
NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CENTRE, at “Partners,” available at
http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121 [Source # 52]; Albert Carames, Vicence Fisas, and Daniel
Luz, Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR Programmes Existing in the World During
2005, INTERNATIONAL SPANISH COOPERATION AGENCY (AECI) 12 (2006), available at
http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf. [Source # 2]
36

Albert Carames, Vicence Fisas, and Daniel Luz, Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR Programmes Existing in the World During 2005, INTERNATIONAL SPANISH COOPERATION AGENCY (AECI) 19
(2006), available at http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf. [Source # 2]

37

United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center: Afghanistan, UNITED
NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CENTRE, at “Background,” available
at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121. [Source # 52]
38

Bart Klem and Pyt Douma, The Struggle after Combat, The Role of NGOs in DDR Processes: Synthesis Study,
(2008), available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3DA879C36B458C8AC12574F7003B6F82-cordaid-ngosddr.pdf. [Source # 49]
CORDAID, 21

39

Bart Klem and Pyt Douma, The Struggle after Combat, The Role of NGOs in DDR Processes: Synthesis Study,
(2008), available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3DA879C36B458C8AC12574F7003B6F82-cordaid-ngosddr.pdf. [Source # 49]
CORDAID, 21
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successful. Many leaders of the illegal armed groups were actually corrupt
government officials, which negatively affected the program. 40
In an effort to establish economic security, the ex-combatants initially
received two different forms of cash payments. Problems arose, however, with
both types. One form of cash payment consisted of a daily pay of $3 or $4 per excombatant for two to four months. Unfortunately, there was a delay in these
payments and limited collection of the money promised. 41 The ex-combatants also
were given a larger payment of $200 in two installments, but commanders in some
regions of the state extorted the money, frequently through the use of force. In
response to these problems, the cash payments were suspended, and the program
administrators instead directed the payments into ex-combatants’ reintegration
packages. 42
The reintegration program in Afghanistan also attempted to help the excombatants’ secure regular employment, but with limited success. In practice, the
ex-combatants frequently were not linked to real opportunities at the expense of
long-term reintegration.43 Also, the small reintegration grants provided to Afghan
ex-combatants were typically insufficient to start a proper enterprise and did not
provide the necessary market tools and power for a small business to survive in the
Afghan economy. 44

40

Bart Klem and Pyt Douma, The Struggle after Combat, The Role of NGOs in DDR Processes: Synthesis Study,
(2008), available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3DA879C36B458C8AC12574F7003B6F82-cordaid-ngosddr.pdf. [Source #49]
CORDAID, 21

41

Albert Carames, Vicence Fisas, and Daniel Luz, Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR Programmes Existing in the World During 2005, INTERNATIONAL SPANISH COOPERATION AGENCY (AECI),
23, 25 (2006), available at http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf. [Source # 2]

42

United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center: Afghanistan, UNITED
NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CENTRE, at “Area of Activity,”
available at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121. [Source # 52]
43

Simonetta Rossi and Antonia Giustozzi, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
(DDR) In Afghanistan: Constrains and Limited Capabilities, CRISIS STATE RESEARCH CENTRE, DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES INSTITUTE, 12 (Working Paper 2, Series 2, June 2006), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=57844. [Source # 18]
44

Simonetta Rossi and Antonia Giustozzi, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
(DDR) In Afghanistan: Constrains and Limited Capabilities, CRISIS STATE RESEARCH CENTRE, DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES INSTITUTE, 12 (Working Paper 2, Series 2, June 2006), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=57844. [Source # 18]
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Burundi
Burundi established the National Commission for Demobilization,
Reinsertion and Reintegration on August 28, 2003. The United Nations
implemented reintegration efforts in Burundi pursuant to Security Council
Resolutions 1545 and 1692 from May 2004 through December 2006. Near the
conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Burundi’s mandate, the Security
Council authorized the Secretary-General in Resolution 1719 to establish the
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi to continue the reintegration efforts.
Organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Children’s Fund
(“UNICEF”) were also involved in the reintegration efforts. Burundi’s program
demobilized 56,000 ex-combatants from different rebel groups, militia groups, and
the armed forces. 45
Burundi’s national program consisted of two-phases: the first step was a
reinsertion package and the second step was reintegration support. The reinsertion
package, which lasted for 18 months, included cash payments with the purpose of
providing immediate support to ex-combatants and their families. Upon discharge
from the demobilization centers, each demobilized ex-combatant received the first
of four installments. The remaining three installments were made through a bank
located near wherever the ex-combatant resettled and were paid over a ten-month
period. The amount of the payment depended on an individual’s situation. The
second step, reintegration support, occurred after an ex-combatant had settled in
his community of choice. The program relied on non-governmental organizations
(“NGO”) and community organizations to conduct social reintegration activities in
the communities. Reintegration support provided further economic support that
the ex-combatant chose to use for specifically mandated purposes that included
employment training, education, and community-based assistance.
Burundi’s reintegration program is generally considered to be a failure as a
result of the program being heavily politicized and corrupt, lacking monitoring,
and employing too much of a top-down approach rather than focusing on
grassroots projects. It is estimated that only 40 percent of ex-combatants who did
not choose to pursue vocational training successfully reintegrated. However, those
ex-combatants who chose to return to rural areas and relied on agricultural

45

Pyt Douma and Jean Marie Gasana, Reintegration in Burundi: between happy cows and lost investments, 14
(Leontine Specker ed., Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090318_cru_reintegration_burundi_specker.pdf. [Source # 37]
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reintegration packages reintegrated more successfully overall than the other excombatants in the program. 46
Central African Republic
The United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) implemented a
reintegration program in the Central African Republic, which closed in 2007. The
program reintegrated 7500 ex-combatants and provided small infrastructure
rehabilitation to the communities into which the ex-combatants settled. 47 It has
been estimated that the reintegration program cost $1758 per person. 48 Various
international organizations had been involved in the reintegration program,
including the United Nations, World Bank, and African Union. 49
The successes of the Central African Republic’s reintegration program
largely can be attributed to the efforts made to provide economic security for the
ex-combatants and the assistance given to the communities that hosted the excombatants. The program provided for payments of $500 to begin a new
profession after the ex-combatants demobilized and completed information
sessions on the reintegration program. Ex-combatants also were issued kits
containing utensils and other basic materials, including buckets, pans, plates, cups,
soap, condoms, and information on sexual responsibility. 50 To further assist excombatants, the program conducted market research in targeted areas to identify
viable economic options for the ex-combatants. 51 Finally, to support the
communities that hosted the ex-combatants, the reintegration program called for
providing each ex-combatant a “reintegration voucher.” Once the ex-combatant
46

Pyt Douma and Jean Marie Gasana, Reintegration in Burundi: between happy cows and lost investments, 30-33
(Leontine Specker ed., Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090318_cru_reintegration_burundi_specker.pdf. [Source # 37]
47

DDR In Peace Operations: A Retrospective, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF RULE OF LAW AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION
(DDR) SECTION, 22 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.unddr.org/documents.php?doc=1281. [Source # 13]
48

Albert Carames, Vicence Fisas, and Daniel Luz, Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR Programmes Existing in the World During 2005, INTERNATIONAL SPANISH COOPERATION AGENCY (AECI) 19
(2006), available at http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf. [Source # 2]

49

Albert Carames, Vicence Fisas, and Daniel Luz, Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR) Programmes Existing in the World During 2005, INTERNATIONAL SPANISH COOPERATION AGENCY (AECI)
12 (2006), available at http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf. [Source # 2]

50

Central African Republic DDR (2004-2007), AGENCE CATALANA COOPERACIO AL DESENVOLUPAMENT 6,
available at http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/rca08i.pdf. [Source # 6]

51

Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Project (ERCS), UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME FOR CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 14, available at http://www.unddr.org/documents.php?doc=804.
[Source # 20]
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selected a community in which to live and became settled, he presented the
voucher to a local commission. The commission made available to the community
the amount of funds equivalent to the number of vouchers collected. The funds
then were used to finance micro-projects for the community aimed at benefiting
the entire population. 52
Colombia
Since the mid-1960s, a number of armed groups have operated in Colombia,
such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”). In the 1980s,
right-wing paramilitary groups emerged, and in 1997, these paramilitary groups
formed an umbrella organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(“AUC”). In 2003, the government signed a peace agreement with the AUC,
called the Santa Fé de Ralito Peace Accord. It provided for a collective
demobilization program for the AUC and an independent demobilization process
for other combatants. The collective demobilization process occurred on and off
from 2003 to 2006, during which “31,687 members of the defense forces
abandoned their military activity, turning in more than 18,000 weapons.” 53
In response, Colombia undertook reintegration programs. Because various
reintegration programs in Colombia have existed from the 1990s to present day,
they have changed their focus and strategies over time. At first the program
focused more on reinsertion assistance. In the 1990s, the government granted a
monthly living allowance to each ex-combatant for six months, as well as a loan to
be used for projects, housing, or college. The reinsertion program also included:
(1) healthcare; (2) education; (3) psychosocial care; (4) social support;
(5) economic reintegration; (6) income-generation activities; and (7) community
reintegration. 54
By 2006, the program began to focus more on reintegration rather than
reinsertion by providing benefits for a longer period of time. The benefits provided
by these reintegration programs were: “(1) monthly sustenance costs; (2) affiliation
52

Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Project (ERCS), UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME FOR CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 17, available at http://www.unddr.org/documents.php?doc=804.
[Source # 20]
53

Sergio Jaramillo, Yaneth Giha, Paul Torres, Transition Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia, INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 13 (June 2009), available at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDRColombia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf. [Source # 50]
54

Maria Derks, Hans Rouw, Ivan Briscoe, A Community Dilemma: DDR and the changing face of violence in
Colombia, PEACE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NETWORK, 26-27, 29 (July 2011), available at
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110700_briscoe_derks_colombia.pdf. [Source # 1]
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with the subsidized health regime; (3) basic and middle education and job training;
(4) psychosocial care; and (5) support for the development of a productive
project.” 55 The program also put in place income generation programs that
included direct employment, internships, or apprenticeships with private
companies.
Côte D’Ivoire
Reintegration efforts began in Côte d’Ivoire in 2005 under a 2003 peace
agreement. 56 A number of international organizations collaborated in Côte
d’Ivoire’s reintegration efforts, including the United Nations, the World Bank,
UNICEF, and the World Food Program. 57 The United Nations deployed
approximately 7,500 troops with a budget of $386 million.
Starting in 2008, the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’s DDR
section, in partnership with the United Nations Development Program, NGOs, and
community based organizations, launched and implemented the 1,000 MicroProjects program in Côte d’Ivoire. The program seeks to provide ex-combatants,
militia members, youth associated with armed conflict, and at-risk youth with
sustainable livelihood opportunities through micro financed projects as alternatives
to violence. The program was implemented in key areas of unrest and instability.
Participants received education and professional training followed by on-the-job
support. They also received psychological and social support. The program was
designed to equip participants with the ability to pursue economic activities in a
variety of fields. Participants are expected to use their training and experience to
launch their own businesses. The program was initially implemented using
$4 million in funding from the Peacebuilding Fund, with a cost per participant of
$700 to $1,000. “While the programme is ongoing and it is too early to properly
assess long-term impacts, many actors, including the government, consider the

55

Sergio Jaramillo, Yaneth Giha, Paul Torres, Transition Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia, INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 2 (June 2009), available at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDRColombia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf. [Source # 50]
56

Albert Carames, Vicence Fisas, and Daniel Luz, Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR) Programmes Existing in the World During 2005, INTERNATIONAL SPANISH COOPERATION AGENCY (AECI),
9 (2006), available at http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf. [Source # 2]

57

Albert Carames, Vicence Fisas, and Daniel Luz, Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR) Programmes Existing in the World During 2005, INTERNATIONAL SPANISH COOPERATION AGENCY (AECI),
10-11 (2006), available at http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf. [Source # 2]
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programme successful in achieving its objectives and many of the projects have
already started a second production cycle with little or no outside support.” 58
Haiti
Following the 2004 break out of internal armed conflict in Haiti, the United
Nations deployed a stabilization force. 59 The United Nations Mission to Haiti
(“MINUSTAH”) included 9,930 troops, a budget of $307 million, and benefited
3,800 individuals. 60 MINUSTAH forces found that conditions in Haiti made
traditional reintegration programs untenable, and reintegration efforts instead
focused on Community Violence Reduction (“CVR”). MINUSTAH’s traditional
reintegration efforts initially targeted formerly armed forces, but it discovered that
urban gangs were the primary threat to the peace process. Armed Haitian gangs
were accustomed to financial gains through criminal activity, and in the absence of
a credible deterrent to future criminality, they lacked an incentive to participate in
reintegration programs. 61 Under the CVR program, armed forces put pressure on
gangs to abandon criminal enterprises and engage with reintegration programs,
while grants were provided to elected community-based committees made up of
representatives of youth, women, elders and adult men to use for employment
programs targeting at-risk youth. 62
The reintegration program included large-scale, labor-intensive projects that
provided temporary community employment, and smaller projects that provided

58

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, 42 (2010), available at http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. [Source # 19]
59

Country Programme: Haiti, UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION, available
at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=80. [Source # 10]

60

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, 11, 19 (2010), available at http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. [Source # 19]
61

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, 18 (2010), available at http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. [Source # 19]
62

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, 45 (2010), available at http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf [Source # 19];
Country Programme: Haiti, UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION, available at
http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=80. [Source # 10]
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professional skills training and apprenticeship placements in the private sector. 63
The use of employment programs in Haiti has met with some success, reducing
gang violence by diverting gang members into employment training programs and
providing temporary employment alternatives to at-risk youth. 64
Liberia
Over a decade of almost continuous conflict ended in Liberia in 2003 with
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Agreement was signed
by the sitting government, all political parties, and the two main armed opposition
groups, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement
for Democracy in Liberia. 65 Liberia’s reintegration program was carried out by a
Joint Implementation Unit formed by the National Commission on Disarmament,
Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration, the United Nations Mission in
Liberia, and the United Nations Development Programme. 66
Liberia’s reintegration program has been a modest success. Ex-combatants
who completed a course of reintegration training have seen an average 8% increase
in their socio-economic condition.67 Over 300 program participants identified as
foreign nationals, and over 50 children have been reunited with their families in
their home countries.68 Participants were asked for their preference of enrolling in

63

DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 18
(2010), available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/ddr/ddr_retrospective102010.pdf. [Source
# 13]

64

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, 45 (2010), available at http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. [Source # 19]
65

Liberia: Violence, Discrimination and Impunity, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2 (Sept. 2005), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR34/003/2005/en/fc7f7cc3-d4b7-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/
afr340032005en.pdf. [Source # 29]

66

United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center: Liberia, UNITED NATIONS
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CENTRE, at “Operational Structure and
Framework,” available at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52. [Source # 53]
67

James Pugel, Key Findings from the Nation Wide Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia: Reintegration and
Reconciliation February-March 2006, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: JOINT IMPLEMENTATION UNIT
(JIU), 2, available at http://unddr.org/docs/nation_wide_survey_of_excombatants_in_Liberia_Reintegration_and_
Reconciliation.pdf. [Source # 26]
68

United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center: Liberia, UNITED NATIONS
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CENTRE, at “Foreign Ex-combatants,” available
at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52. [Source # 53]
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formal education or vocational training.69 Formal education lasted for three years,
and participants were given uniforms, fees, and a modest allowance for the first
two years. 70 Vocational training was offered in several trades, including auto
mechanics, as well as agricultural training. 71 In some areas, however, Liberia’s
reintegration program suffered due to lack of meaningful employment
opportunities, and as a result, many ex-combatants returned to lives of crime,
including occupying some of the country’s major rubber plantations. 72
Mozambique
In December 1992, the Security Council authorized the deployment of the
United Nations Operation In Mozambique. 73 The Operation implemented the
DDR program, which took place from March to late August 1994, involving more
than 76,000 soldiers. 74 Numerous international donors sponsored programs to
assist the DDR process in Mozambique, including the International Office for
Migration, which provided transportation for the ex-combatants and their
dependants. 75 The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination carried out the reintegration of ex-combatants. 76 Over thirty
69
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international organizations and NGOs sponsored programs for reintegrating the excombatants. 77 By October 1994, over 200,000 former combatants and their
dependants had been reintegrated.
The Mozambique reintegration process generally is considered to have been
successful. 78 Analyses of the program attribute a great deal of that success to the
program’s provision of monthly payments to the ex-combatants. 79 The excombatants received monthly payments of $75 to $130, depending on their rank,
which lasted for two years. Most of the cash delivered was used as intended—
typically on food, clothes, healthcare, and similar items. 80 The ex-combatants also
were given severance pay, subsidies, food, transportation to a location of their
choice, and training and occupational skills programs, which contributed to the
program’s positive results. 81
Community-based reconciliation activities also assisted the ex-combatants in
reintegrating into society. The communities conducted rituals of reconciliation for
the ex-combatants, which sought to reconcile the individual by purging the “spirit
of war and aggression” from his “heart and soul.” 82 These rituals were particularly
(continued…)
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effective in rural areas where traditional forms of reconciliation are still an
important part of people’s lives. 83
Nevertheless, the reintegration program in Mozambique also had its
problems. One problem was that only one out of six ex-combatants received any
form of training. For those ex-combatants who did receive some training, the
training was often inappropriate because the program administrators generally had
insufficient knowledge of the ex-combatants’ backgrounds and educational levels
and failed to conduct a market survey of the skills in demand. 84 In addition, the
psychological needs of the ex-combatants were not significantly addressed. 85
Rwanda
Approximately 54,000 ex-combatants have been reintegrated in Rwanda
since 1995. 86 Participants have belonged to five distinct yet overlapping military
forces, from the post-genocide Rwandan military to armed Rwandan rebels
fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 87 In 2001, the World Bank and
a Multilateral Donor Trust Fund financed a $500 million USD reintegration
program. 88
Rwandan ex-combatants are given anywhere from $150 to $2,000 USD,
depending on their group affiliation and rank, and former professional soldiers are
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given an additional allowance ranging from $300 to $1,000 USD. 89 Instead of
vocational training, the ex-combatants went through “sensitization training” in
“solidarity camps.” 90 These camps, also called ingando, are often in remote,
secluded areas. 91 Attendance is mandatory. The attendees are often given
uniforms. 92 Activities include military training, manual labor, lectures, and
cultural activities. 93 Common lecture topics are Rwandan history, civil education,
national unity and reconciliation, micro-financing, and public health (with an
emphasis on HIV/AIDS). 94 Depending on the faction in which one fought,
“sensitization training” could take as little as two weeks or as long as two
months. 95 Although reintegrated ex-combatants in Rwanda often struggled
economically, especially with access to land and housing, they were not as a whole
worse off than the rest of the population. 96
Sierra Leone
With the help of the Economic Community of West African States
(“ECOWAS”) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (“UNAMSIL”),
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Sierra Leone completed its reintegration program in early 2004. 97 By that time,
over 50,000 ex-combatants, most from Sierra Leone’s recent 11-year civil war, had
received assistance, including formal education, vocational training, agricultural
training, and job placement. 98 Those that could not be helped by the program were
given a one-time payment equivalent to $150 USD. 99
UNAMSIL had success implementing a “stop gap” program in Sierra Leone
where about 6,000 ex-combatants and 1,500 community members worked together
on labor-intensive, quick-impact community infrastructure and agricultural
development projects. The workers ate meals and played recreational sports
together, helping foster a sense of community within the group. Rebuilding
infrastructure that had been destroyed in the war had a positive effect on
communities and helped the ex-combatants gain acceptance. 100
Solomon Islands
Following internal, inter-ethnic hostilities in the Solomon Islands, various
measures were used in 2000 to restore security and deter further violence. These
efforts included having one hundred members of each combating faction join the
Special Constabulary division of the Royal Solomon. 101 Numerous individuals
improperly joined the Special Constabulary, however, and by 2001 their ranks had
swollen from 400 to over 2000, with the majority settling in the capital Honiara.
The newly minted Special Constabulary members demanded payment for full-time
employment, sometimes using threats of force, which drained public coffers and
undermined state security. 102 After reducing the Special Constabulary ranks to
97

United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center: Sierra Leone, UNITED
NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CENTRE, at “DDR Strategy and
Approach,” available at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60. [Source # 54]
98

United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center: Sierra Leone, UNITED
NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CENTRE, at “Reintegration,” available
at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60. [Source # 54]
99

United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center: Sierra Leone, UNITED
NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CENTRE, at “Reintegration,” available
at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60. [Source # 54]
100

Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 49, available at http://www.beta.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/cpr/
documents/ddr/DDR_Practice_Note_English_PDF.pdf. [Source # 34]
101

Country Programme: Solomon Islands, UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND
REINTEGRATION, available at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=180. [Source # 11]
102

Country Programme: Solomon Islands, UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND
REINTEGRATION, available at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=180. [Source # 11]

23

PILPG: Confidential

Piracy Reintegration Efforts, February 7, 2012

1200, the Solomon Island authorities asked the United Nations Development
Programme to design a reintegration program to address the remaining Special
Constabulary. The UNDP responded with a reintegration program that provided
participants with a choice of vocational skills training, job placement, or a micro
financed business endeavor. The reintegration program successfully dissolved the
remaining Special Constabulary. 103
Uganda
Beginning in 1986, resistance groups have engaged in violent actions against
the government. In 2000, Uganda enacted an Amnesty Act to promote a peace
process. 104 The state’s reintegration efforts occurred within the framework of this
act through 2007. Uganda undertook further reintegration efforts through midSeptember 2011, at which time the program ran out of funds. 105 The Ugandan
program provided initial reinsertion support, which included cash payments, as
well as longer term reintegration support. In the reinsertion phase, Uganda
provided a “settling in package.” This reinsertion package was successful in aiding
reintegration efforts because it included cash payments, utilized the banking
system, and was effectively monitored. Uganda also relied heavily on nongovernmental organizations, both national and international.
Recommendations for Implementation of Reintegration Programs in Kenya,
Mauritius, Seychelles, and Somalia
The reintegration efforts of other states provide important lessons for states
endeavoring to reintegrate former pirates into their societies. According to a
majority of scholars who reviewed some of these past programs, the “most
decisive” factor in post-demobilization success in a reintegration program is
ensuring the economic security of the ex-combatants. If the ex-combatants are not
able to economically survive via peaceful and legitimate means, they likely will
take up arms again. 106 Successful reintegration programs are able to minimize the
103
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time gap between discharge from incarceration and reintegration into the excombatant’s new home. 107 All prior and current reintegration programs have been
criticized for their shortcomings in achieving this goal, but there have also been
success stories. Seychelles, Kenya, Mauritius, and Somalia can learn from the
mistakes and successes of these other programs. The following are suggestions
and considerations for ensuring the economic and physical security of excombatants gleaned from the reintegration components of past and current DDR
programs.
Provide Cash Payments to Ex-Combatants
A portion of any reintegration package should be monetary. Although
providing cash will result in instances of mismanagement and corruption, the
benefits of providing choice, empowering recipients, and stimulating the local
economy outweigh those risks. Cash transfers over an extended period of time can
be effective in helping ex-combatants establish themselves in a new community or
return to their former communities, as long as the payments are made in a prompt,
dependable, and accessible manner. 108
At minimum, reintegration programs should provide cash during the shorter
reinsertion phase. The states of Mozambique and Uganda, for example, both
offered cash payments in the reinsertion phase. In Mozambique, the program
provided ex-combatants with reinsertion packages that included severance pay,
subsidies, food, and transportation to a location of their choice. 109 Uganda
similarly provided a “settling in package,” which included cash payments plus
“food and clothing, temporary shelter and building materials, health and education
assistance, agricultural tools and seeds, and transportation to a community of
choice.” 110 The purpose of the settling in package was to support an ex107
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combatant’s transition to a productive civilian life for one agricultural growing
season of six months. 111 Upon review of this program, Sweden’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs concluded that Uganda’s system of cash payments “worked
efficiently and effectively,” 112 and as a result advocates that all reintegration
programs include transitional safety nets that are a combination of in-kind and cash
entitlements. 113
Ideally, cash payments also should extend beyond the reinsertion phase and
into the reintegration phase. Programs in the Central African Republic, 114 Liberia,
115
Rwanda, 116 Afghanistan, 117 and Mozambique, 118 continued cash payments to
ex-combatants during the reintegration phase. Analyses of Mozambique’s
reintegration program attribute a great deal of the program’s success in the
establishment of security to these monthly payments.
It is also helpful to utilize the banking system to administer cash payments.
Many ex-combatants will not be familiar with the banking system and will have no
access to credit. By requiring an ex-combatant to receive funds through the
banking system, the program will familiarize the ex-combatant with the system and
may facilitate access to credit. In Burundi, the National Demobilization,
111
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Reinsertion and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants Program provided a reinsertion
package that included cash payments. Upon discharge from the demobilization
centers, each demobilized ex-combatant received the first of four installments. The
remaining three installments were made through a bank located near wherever the
ex-combatant resettled and were paid over a ten-month period. The money was
intended to cover a period of 18 months. Over this time period, reintegration
assistance was prepared. 119 Uganda’s assistance program also required participants
to receive money from local banks.
Despite the importance of cash payments to the success of reintegration
programs, the administrators of such programs must continuously monitor the
payments to ensure they are accomplishing the programs’ goals and to prevent
mismanagement and corruption. As discussed above, early in Afghanistan’s
reintegration program, certain corrupt commanders extorted the $100 cash
payments being given to ex-combatants, often through the use of force.
Accordingly, the payments had to be suspended. The program administrators
instead directed the payments into ex-combatants’ reintegration packages by
increasing the ex-combatants’ weekly stipend or providing extra equipment to
them. 120
Therefore, when administered in conjunction with monitoring, cash
payments are a vital component of reintegration efforts.
Prepare Ex-combatants for or Provide Relevant and Adequate Employment
Employment programs provide economic incentives as an alternative to
violence. Reintegration programs have successfully used emergency employment
programs in post-conflict settings to divert militants into labor-intensive projects,
which are typically related to infrastructure rehabilitation, small scale agriculture,
or manufacturing. Employment programs provide quick wins that demonstrate
DDR program benefits and provide incentives for militants to engage with the
peace process. The United Nations recommends employment programs where
there is high unemployment, low capacity in the labor market to absorb militants, a
high potential for militants to return to fighting of criminal activity, or a gap
119
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between demobilization and reintegration.121 The United Nations has identified a
number of considerations relevant to employment programs. 122
Programs Must Conduct Market Surveys to Identify What Jobs Are in
Demand.
In determining the skills in which the ex-combatants should be trained and
selecting microenterprises in which to invest, it is necessary to conduct market
surveys to identify the skills and businesses in demand in the particular economy.
In the Central African Republic, for example, the reintegration program conducted
market research in targeted areas to identify viable economic options for the excombatants and to support self-employment and micro enterprises in important
sectors of the Central African Republic’s economy, including agriculture, mining,
road construction and maintenance, water and electricity distribution, and waste
management. 123
Many reintegration programs, however, have not sufficiently undertaken this
type of market survey, with the result that ex-combatants have been placed in
markets without much economic potential. 124 This was the case in Afghanistan
where too much professional training for the same job was provided, which forced
many ex-combatants to emigrate in order to find work. 125 Similar problems
occurred in Mozambique, where there also was generally insufficient knowledge of
the ex-combatants’ background and educational level, resulting in inappropriate
types of training. For example, ex-combatants were trained as electricians but
returned to areas without electricity. 126 Most programs in Mozambique that
121
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consisted of skill training or income-generating activities were in urban or periurban areas. There, the cost of transportation could be up to half of the monthly
pension payments certain ex-combatants received. 127
Colombia’s reintegration efforts also failed to consider market realities. The
Colombia program was created by administrators in Bogotá and did not account
for the realities of integration into rural communities. Some of the projects
designed in Bogotá were unfeasible in regions where they were to be implemented,
and important actors in each region were not involved in the projects. Also, in
certain cases, there was no available land where demobilized people wished to
settle, and even where there was land available, it could not always be assigned to
the specific projects that ex-combatants wanted to undertake. 128 Moreover, some
of the available land may have been or perceived to have been stolen by
paramilitary groups from local communities, so the local communities did not want
ex-combatants owning or profiting from the land. 129
Programs Should Balance Individual Ex-combatants’ Preferences with the
Practical Limitations of the Job Market.
Another factor to consider in creating a reintegration program is that excombatants have their own opinions as to what jobs they would like to pursue. 130
When determining what employment opportunities exist for ex-combatants, it is
important to consider that people might not be successful if they are not
performing work that they enjoy. Ex-combatants should be divided into target
groups based on their mode of subsistence so that the program can tailor aid to
meet ex-combatants’ needs. 131 This goal will be difficult to achieve, as ex-
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combatants can only choose from available jobs, and ex-combatants might lack the
skills or education required to perform certain jobs.
The United Nations reintegration program in the Solomon Islands included
an employment program that took ex-combatant’s preferences into account by
providing the ex-combatants with options. As part of their reintegration,
participants were given a choice of vocational skills training, job placement, or a
micro financed business endeavor. Those participants who selected a micro
financed endeavor were admitted to attend a five-day small business management
training course, and reintegration officials provided assistance in business design.
Once applicants’ business plans were approved, they received grants in two
installments on the condition that they complete business training and comply with
the terms and conditions of their grant agreements. Reintegration officials
provided participants with any technical assistance they required, and specialists
provided advice on business issues during the early phases of implementation.
These resources allowed participants to overcome unforeseen obstacles that
otherwise may have undermined their endeavors. 132
Burundi and Liberia’s reintegration programs are examples of the difficulties
of addressing ex-combatants’ employment preferences. Although craftsmen were
eager to take on apprentices in Burundi, most ex-combatants were not interested in
vocational training. Only five percent of adult ex-combatants chose to participate
in vocational training. 133 A survey completed by ex-combatants in Liberia from
early 2007 indicates that ex-combatants would much rather work in mechanics,
carpentry, masonry, or tailoring—fields in which opportunities are scarce—than
work in agriculture, despite the ex-combatants’ belief that agriculture is the
industry with the greatest economic potential. 134 This same survey revealed that
approximately 65% of ex-combatants who had reentered the workforce expressed
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frustration over lack of permanent jobs. 135 Thus, programs must carefully balance
ex-combatants’ preferences with economic realities.
Programs Should Provide Employment Training and, in Some Situations,
Formal Education.
To have any chance at economic success, the ex-combatants must receive
sufficient employment training. Particularly for those ex-combatants who choose
to be self-employed, the program should provide sufficient training in market
structures, accounting, and management; practical skills through vocational
training or apprenticeships; and sufficient capital and credit. 136
Apprenticeships and on-the-job training are preferable to vocational training
because it is easier for those who lack education to acquire skills through
apprenticeships. 137 Apprenticeships and on-the-job training also give excombatants contacts and valuable references that potentially could be used when
seeking new employment and allow ex-combatants to increase their networking
skills. 138
Depending on the situation and goals of each ex-combatant, particularly the
younger demographic, integration into formal education may be a better option
than integration into employment programs. Instead of, or in addition to, grants or
wages, ex-combatants can receive scholarships to encourage them to complete a
course of study. 139 A 2004 study of Liberian ex-combatants of all ages found that
38% preferred to be reintegrated into formal education, as opposed to vocational
training and apprenticeship (57%), agriculture (3%), or small enterprise
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development (2%). 140 Integration into formal education is particularly important
when a younger ex-combatant has spent years fighting instead of attending school,
or when the ex-combatant’s home community does not have an established
education system. 141
Therefore, employment training and educational programs should be
implemented in prisons for Somali ex-combatants. Participants could receive job
training during incarceration based on Somali labor market forecasts or labor
market forecasts of the receiving state, depending on where the ex-combatants will
reintegrate upon release from prison. If market projections indicate future
employment capacity in agriculture, the prisons could provide participants with
agriculture training and education, and on-the-job training at prison farms during
incarceration. 142 Upon release, micro financing could fund the participants’ effort
to develop new small-scale farms. Similarly, if there are future opportunities in the
construction field, inmates could develop construction skills while working on
labor intensive infrastructure rehabilitation projects during incarceration. Upon
release, participants could use their acquired skills to work on infrastructure
projects or provide construction services in their communities.
When Unemployment is High and Jobs are not Available, Reintegration
Programs Should Create Their Own Jobs.
If jobs are not available in the existing economy, a program should create
jobs by implementing short-term community projects. In Haiti, for example,
grants for employment programs targeting at-risk youth were provided to elected
community-based committees made up of representatives of youth, women, elders,
and adult men. 143 Large-scale, labor-intensive projects provide temporary
140
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community employment, and smaller projects provide professional skills training
apprenticeship placements in the private sector. 144 The use of employment
programs in Haiti “appears to be contributing to lowering gang violence through
the training of former gang members, and by providing temporary livelihood
alternatives for at-risk youth.” 145 A study found that “[c]rime rates have
significantly lowered in some communities, while 42 projects provide direct
income to over 14,000 laborers; vocational skills for 600 at-risk youths; skills
training for 780 former armed inmates; [and] medical/legal assistance and skills
training for 100 women victims of violence.” 146
Côte d’Ivoire’s job creation efforts through its 1,000 Micro-Projects
program have been particularly successful. The program, implemented in key
areas of unrest and instability, seeks to provide ex-combatants, militia members,
youth associated with armed conflict, and at-risk youth with sustainable livelihood
opportunities through micro financed projects as alternatives to violence. The
program was designed to equip participants with the ability to pursue economic
activities in a variety of fields, including shopkeeping, mechanic workshops,
telephone booths, motorbike taxis, soap making, and agricultural projects, such as
raising chicken, cattle, pigs, and rabbits. Participants are expected to use their
training and experience to launch their own businesses. 147
As part of the 1,000 Micro-Projects Program, a group of seven excombatants worked together to launch a pig farm. The participants purchased and
bred twenty-one pigs at four sites. After six months, the participants had bred
seven times as many pigs as they started with, and had expanded their operations to
twelve sites. The community accepted the participants and donated lands for

144

DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 18
(2010), available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/ddr/ddr_retrospective102010.pdf. [Source
# 13]
145

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, 45 (2010), available at http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. [Source # 19]
146

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, 45 (2010), available at http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. [Source # 19]
147

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, 42 (2010), available at http://unddr.org/docs/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf. [Source # 19]

33

PILPG: Confidential

Piracy Reintegration Efforts, February 7, 2012

additional agriculture activities. The pig farms have completed six reproduction
cycles and now produce meat for the host community and surrounding markets. 148
In addition, prisons should implement stop-gap programs. The United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, for instance, implemented a stop-gap program
that employed thousands of ex-combatants, along with community members, in
short-term infrastructure and agricultural development projects. 149 This program
implemented community based, labor intensive, quick-impact projects in areas
presenting the greatest security threats. Working side by side with community
members helped the ex-combatants feel welcome in their communities. 150 Excombatants and vulnerable community members worked on projects to rehabilitate
the agricultural sector and improve access to rural areas in exchange for food and
wages. Evaluations of this program find that not only did the security situation
improve, but the program “contributed to the return of international and local
NGOs, helped to build a culture of peaceful conflict resolution and fostered
reconciliation by having community members and ex-combatants work side-byside.” 151
Liberia’s Joint Operations Plan, on the other hand, failed to implement stopgap programs. Although encampment periods were reduced from weeks to days,
ex-combatants were discharged en masse, without preparation or counseling. 152
Because opportunities for reintegration could not be created to match the large
number of discharged ex-combatants, many of the ex-combatants ended up
unemployed. 153 However, by using funds from the United Nations Mission in
148
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Liberia (“UNMIL”), Liberia was able to undertake some quick impact projects to
rehabilitate many of its prisons. 154
Therefore, properly implemented “stop-gap” programs could be beneficial
for displaced ex-combatants while they are prisoners and after their release.
Putting the ex-combatant prisoner to work alongside native prisoners in rebuilding
prison or other community infrastructure will help create geographical and
interpersonal ties to the new state in which the ex-combatant will eventually be
integrated. Program officials, however, should closely monitor these interactions
to assure that the displaced ex-combatants do not forge new criminal ties.
Programs Should Engage the Private Sector.
In order to find sufficient jobs for ex-combatants, a reintegration program
must work closely with businesses in the private sector. To that end, employment
programs for displaced ex-combatants should focus on placement in existing
businesses, rather than riskier start-up ventures. Programs should seek out
employers that are expanding their businesses, as this not only minimizes the
chance of failure, but also avoids displacing existing workers from their jobs. 155
Participating businesses should be monitored to ensure that the businesses succeed.
One potential barrier to engaging the private sector is convincing companies
to work with ex-combatants. For example, in Colombia, the private sector has not
been interested in employing ex-combatants. 156 Companies expressed safety
concerns and that they lacked government support. Despite this challenge, some
programs involving the reintegration of former military and militia members have
successfully employed ex-combatants within the security sector. 157 This practice
might not be as applicable in the piracy situation where the ex-combatants were
engaged in criminal rather than military activities.
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Account for Criminal Organizations.
As criminal organizations prey on the disenfranchised, ex-combatants can be
easy to recruit. Instability and violence undermine reintegration by precluding
local and foreign investment. It is often difficult for ex-combatants to resist the
temptation to join lucrative illicit activities, and their safety may rely on
maintaining their affiliation with armed groups.
The ex-combatants most at risk for returning to combat are those with some
degree of job skills, but no job in which to apply them. In Liberia, for instance,
unemployed ex-combatants were 40% more likely than employed ex-combatants to
be willing to return to combat for money or wealth. 158 Unemployed ex-combatants
who held jobs before the war were even more likely to envision taking up arms
once again. 159
Thus, it is necessary to provide economic security to ex-combatants to
reduce recruitment (or re-recruitment) into a criminal organization. This can be
accomplished by implementing some of the employment and training
recommendations above. Moreover, the organization IKV Pax Christi
recommends coupling military action against the criminal groups and
socioeconomic development to undermine the success of the criminal
organizations. 160
Reintegration Kits Must Include Tools and Goods that are Relevant to the
Ex-combatants’ Skills, Planned Employment, and the Geographic Area.
Just as training must be practical, the reintegration kits should be tailored for
individuals’ needs. Reintegration kits are packages that include a combination of
tools, goods, and cash payments and are designed to jumpstart an ex-combatant’s
business. The kits provided to ex-combatants should take into consideration the
types of employment they plan to pursue and the local climate and realities of
where they plans to resettle. Indeed, in past programs where participants all
received the same reintegration kits, many could not utilize the tools and goods. In
158
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Afghanistan, for example, although some ex-combatants were offered different
reintegrating packages, the main option for reintegration kits was livestock. Excombatants who chose livestock faced many problems, including lack of proper
training in how to care for the livestock and not being able to afford the high cost
of the livestock’s food. 161 Therefore, many of the livestock-related reintegration
kits were not useful to ex-combatants. Similar problems occurred in
Mozambique’s reintegration program. All ex-combatants were provided kits
composed of hoes, buckets, and seeds, despite the fact that only 25% of the excombatants worked in agriculture or related areas before the war. 162
Invest in the Broader Community in Which the Ex-combatants Will Settle
Rather Than Just the Ex-combatants as Individuals.
Multiple case studies of reintegration programs in African states have shown
that social support is vital to the integration process, whether that support comes
from family, religion, or fellow ex-combatants. 163 The need for community
involvement in ex-combatants’ reintegration was highlighted in a state-wide survey
of ex-combatants in Liberia in 2006 that found a “highly significant negative
relationship between being alone and reintegrating successfully.” 164
The communities’ capacity to reintegrate ex-combatants increases when the
local community also benefits from the reintegration process, 165 such as was seen
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in Central African Republic’s community voucher program, discussed above. 166
The experience in Mozambique also indicates that community reception plays a
critical role in successfully re-habilitating ex-combatants. 167 Significant
reconciliation activities were organized by the communities in which the excombatants located. Such rituals have been found to be most effective in rural
areas where traditional forms of reconciliation are still an important part of
people’s lives. 168
Programs that provide aid exclusively to ex-combatants often result in the
local population resenting what it sees as undeserved special treatment of the excombatants, which hinders social assimilation. 169 Burundi’s reintegration efforts
have been criticized for focusing too much on the individual ex-combatant and not
enough on the host community. According to Clingendael, this caused excombatants to remain in a separate social category, caused non-combatants to
consider the ex-combatants as privileged, and hindered host communities’
acceptances of the ex-combatants. 170
Reintegration Programs Must Include Psychological Counseling and Peace
Resolution Training.
Psychological counseling is also an important aspect of social
reintegration. 171 Many ex-combatants have developed psychological problems due
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to witnessing or engaging in violent acts. 172 In an attempt to cope with these
issues, ex-combatants turn to alcohol and/or drug abuse with alarming
frequency. 173 Furthermore, ex-combatants should be given training in how to
solve conflicts without the use of violence. Education and training programs
permit ex-combatants to learn the norms and practices of civil society. 174
Community mechanisms that encourage ex-combatants to see themselves as
community citizens are an important asset. 175
Involve Non-Governmental Organizations.
Non-governmental organizations may have access to resources and may
have an established presence in a local community that states can use to effectively
implement reintegration programs. As discussed above, Côte d’Ivoire successfully
utilized the resources of NGOs when implementing its 1,000 Micro-Projects
program.
Programs also should consider asking members of NGOs to serve as
international observers who monitor the programs’ progress. Some organizations
suggest that permitting international observers to oversee the reintegration process
enhances the credibility of the process. 176
Carefully Consider When to Terminate Benefits.
In deciding when to terminate benefits, program administrators must balance
an individualized approach with the concern over creating dependency. In
Columbia, for example, the reintegration program initially capped benefits at 19
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months for the collectively demobilized and 24 months for the individually
demobilized. 177 However, it was later determined that there should not be a set
time limit on reintegration monetary support, and the program was modified
accordingly. So long as a person was enrolled in the program and participated in a
sanctioned reintegration activity, and his or her reintegration was not determined to
be complete, then he or she continued to receive reintegration benefits. 178 This
abolishment of the set time limit to receive funds raised the concern that the system
created a culture of dependency. 179 Because of this potential problem, programs
should consider having “[i]ndividualized tracks, but with clear end-goals and enddates for each ex-combatant.” 180
Account for Underage Ex-combatants.
The recruitment of children to engage in piracy appears to be on the rise.
Special considerations exist for the care of children. First and foremost, the
program must ensure the youth ex-combatants’ physical security. 181 In the
traditional DDR process, it is necessary to place the children in transit centers
separate from adult ex-combatants after demobilization while reunification with
their families is being prepared. 182 Similarly, in this case, if children are captured
and detained, they should be held in separate facilities that properly account for
their safety.
Youth-based reintegration efforts can begin while the underage excombatants are in transit centers. At this time, they should be evaluated for health
177
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programs and aggressive wartime behaviors, as well as the status of their education
and training, and to prepare a plan to address such issues. 183 In addition, the
underage ex-combatants should be provided access to education and different
training programs.
Reviews of reintegration programs for children emphasize the importance of
reuniting children with their families, as this typically decreases their
vulnerability. 184 As the children’s families may be in Somalia and may be difficult
to locate, it will likely be difficult for states to help children successfully reunite
with their families in the piracy context. When possible, it should be achieved.
Communicate About the Reintegration Program to the Public Effectively.
It is important to communicate effectively both to the public and to the excombatants themselves about the program’s components and the purposes behind
the program. If information about the purpose of projects is not conveyed
adequately, people will fill in the information gaps themselves, sometimes with
incorrect information. As additional means of creating a safer environment for
newly reintegrated ex-combatants, local communities should be educated about the
ex-combatants through meetings, seminars, and information campaigns. 185 For
example, in Sierra Leone, the UNDP helped lessen tension and increase
transparency by funding forums to foster discussion of demobilization and
reintegration among government, military, religious, and civilian leaders. 186
Conclusion
States undertaking the reintegration of former Somali pirates can utilize
lessons from other reintegration programs. The main priority for reintegration
programs is to ensure the economic and physical security of ex-combatants. To
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accomplish this, states should establish programs that provide money, employment
training, and reintegration kits to ex-combatants. In certain circumstances, the
reintegration programs should create jobs for the ex-combatants. These programs
should be implemented while the ex-combatants are incarcerated instead of waiting
for their release from prison. All aspects of reintegration programs must be
carefully monitored.
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About the Public International Law & Policy Group
The Public International Law & Policy Group, a 2005 Nobel Peace Prize nominee, is a nonprofit organization, which operates as a global pro bono law firm providing free legal assistance
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